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Contemporary neuropsychology and neuroscience are 
replete with examples of non-conscious perception 
of visual stimuli, including emotion-inducing ones1. 
Visual stimuli with emotional significance that are not 
perceived consciously nevertheless induce behavioural 
and neurophysiological responses that are indicative of 
a change in emotional state. The notion that emotional 
events are sometimes not accessible to consciousness 
has long been familiar, but the last two decades have 
seen a radical departure from previous psychodynamic 
conceptualizations associated with Freud and a move-
ment towards evolution-inspired accounts of emotions 
and consciousness2–7 (BOX 1). Non-conscious perception 
of emotional stimuli must therefore be considered an 
intrinsic property of the healthy brain and there is now 
sufficient evidence that such perception is implemented 
in phylogenetically ancient brain structures5,8, mainly in 
subcortical nuclei. In fact, the evolution of brain struc-
tures that are implicated in emotion processing preceded 
the emergence of neural systems that are involved in sus-
taining perceptual consciousness. These structures can 
be studied to tackle the longstanding and un answered 
question of what makes a stimulus intrinsically 
emotional for the brain9.
Here, we first review different examples of non-
conscious perception of emotional stimuli. Next, we 
describe the neural structures composing the subcortical 
system that underlies these processes in the adult human 
brain and compare structures and functions of this 
system across species. Finally, we review evidence that 
non-conscious perception of emotions can be measured 
at the behavioural and neurophysiological level, and that 
it induces changes in cortical and subcortical areas that 
implement these emotion-related functions, including 
structures that are involved in action preparation. We 
argue that non-conscious perception of emotional stimuli 
is not equivalent to perceiving the same stimuli ‘minus’ 
consciousness, but that it is a distinct phenomenon 
with specific evolutionary benefits.
Types of non-conscious perception
Only a fraction of sensory input gives rise to conscious 
perception. Filtering out irrelevant information and 
keeping only what is relevant for conscious percep-
tion is a function traditionally attributed to selective 
attention10. In this Review, we use the term ‘attentional 
unawareness’ for the absence of stimulus awareness 
resulting from attentional selection. However, one may 
also fail to consciously perceive a stimulus for sensory 
reasons11. For example, if the stimulus energy is too weak 
(that is, below the detection threshold) or the present-
ation time too brief (that is, subliminal), the stimulus 
often does not generate a conscious sensation even when 
we are paying attention to it12,13. In this case we use the 
term ‘sensory unawareness’. Although both phenomena 
render the observer unaware of the stimulus, they involve 
different brain processes14.
Attentional unawareness. Psychophysical evidence 
indicates that visual perception of items that lie out-
side the focus of attention is attenuated or abolished15. 
Accordingly, when attentional resources are engaged in 
a task, cortical activity that is evoked in visual areas by 
unattended (that is, task-irrelevant) stimuli is suppressed 
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Abstract | Many emotional stimuli are processed without being consciously perceived. 
Recent evidence indicates that subcortical structures have a substantial role in this 
processing. These structures are part of a phylogenetically ancient pathway that has specific 
functional properties and that interacts with cortical processes. There is now increasing 
evidence that non-consciously perceived emotional stimuli induce distinct 
neurophysiological changes and influence behaviour towards the consciously perceived 
world. Understanding the neural bases of the non-conscious perception of emotional signals 
will clarify the phylogenetic continuity of emotion systems across species and the integration 
of cortical and subcortical activity in the human brain.
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by top-down influences from frontoparietal regions16. 
Emotional stimuli seem to constitute an exception to this 
effect of attention; indeed, there is extensive evidence 
from behavioural studies that processing of emotional 
information is prioritized17 (that is, it is less dependent 
on attentional resources than neutral information). For 
this reason, emotional stimuli that are task-irrelevant, 
and ignored, nevertheless interfere with ongoing 
tasks18,19, delay disengagement of attention20 and are 
more easily detected than neutral stimuli — as shown 
in visual search21,22 and attentional blink paradigms23 
(BOX 2). Notably, however, damage to the amygdala 
abolishes some of these effects24.
Neuroimaging studies in which attention is 
manipulated using a dual-task design have revealed 
the brain structures that process unattended emotional 
stimuli. In most of the studies, stimulus-evoked activ-
ity in subcortical structures such as the amygdala is not 
suppressed when fearful stimuli are unattended25–28, 
but this activity can be reduced when the observer 
performs a visually demanding task29–32. Although per-
ception of unattended emotional stimuli is often quali-
fied as non-conscious, it would be more appropriate to 
define it as pre-attentive (that is, occurring before, and 
independently from, attentional selection), unless one 
can demonstrate that unattended emotional stimuli are 
also not consciously perceived. This additional check 
is rarely performed27,28, creating uncertainty about 
whether emotion perception is truly non-conscious in 
attention-manipulation paradigms.
Research in patients with pathologically limited 
attention circumvents some of the limitations of studies 
in healthy individuals. It supports the notion that lack of 
attention can result in non-conscious perception of emo-
tions and provides additional evidence for the neural basis 
of non-conscious perception. For example, patients with 
hemispatial neglect due to right temporoparietal lesions 
typically fail to pay attention to the contralesional (left) 
space. Stimuli appearing on the contralesional side often 
go undetected despite the fact that they are processed 
normally in bilaterally intact visual areas. Nevertheless, 
these undetected emotional stimuli can activate emotion-
sensitive areas in subcortical structures (for example, 
the amygdala) as well as in portions of the cortex that 
are directly connected to these structures (for example, 
the orbitofrontal cortex)33, and they can gain access to 
visual awareness more often than neutral stimuli under 
identical conditions34–38. This effect is reminiscent of the 
preferential visual processing of task-irrelevant emotions 
in healthy observers (described above) and presumably 
engages similar mechanisms.
Sensory unawareness. Backward masking and binocular 
rivalry (BOX 2) are two key experimental paradigms for 
investigating sensory unawareness in healthy observers. 
Both methods interfere with activity in the ventral 
occipitotemporal cortex, an area that is supposed to 
be crucial for visual awareness39,40. Studies using these 
paradigms have shown that non-consciously perceived 
emotional stimuli elicit physiological responses that are 
indicative of autonomic arousal3,41,42, trigger specific 
electrophysiological components43 and induce spont-
aneous facial muscle activity that reflects the emotion 
conveyed by the stimulus44,45. Neuroimaging studies 
using backward masking6,7,46–54 or binocular rivalry55–57 
have shown that non-consciously perceived emo-
tional stimuli elicit activity in the amygdala, superior 
colliculus, basal ganglia and pulvinar. Activity in sub-
cortical structures is the same, and in several cases even 
enhanced, in response to non-consciously perceived 
stimuli compared with activity in response to con-
sciously perceived stimuli25,56. Conversely, activity in 
occipitotemporal, frontal or cingulate areas is typically 
higher in response to emotional stimuli that are con-
sciously perceived and this activity can be suppressed 
under conditions of visual unawareness7.
It was initially suggested that early studies using 
subjective measures of participants’ awareness possibly 
overestimated the extent of non-conscious perception 
of emotional stimuli and identified neural correlates 
that in fact reflect partial stimulus awareness29,58–60. 
However, more recent studies with very restrictive (that 
is, objective) criteria for defining visual awareness have 
supported these early findings50,52,54,60,61. Nevertheless, 
assessing the neural bases of non-conscious perception 
 Box 1 | Consciousness: Facing the terminological jungle
Consciousness has been one of the most debated issues in the history of psychology 
and neuroscience. The different notions that attempt to clarify what is meant by 
non-consciousness tend to reflect different theoretical backgrounds and the 
methodologies used to investigate awareness. It is useful to make a distinction 
between ‘unconscious’ and ‘non-conscious’. The first term is rooted in the 
psychoanalytical tradition and postulates the existence of an active mechanism  
of psychodynamic suppression of conscious information. By contrast, the use of 
‘non-conscious’ is rooted in the experimental psychology tradition and indicates a 
perceptual state in which the subject does not report the presence of a stimulus or of 
one of its attributes (for example, its emotional content) even though there is evidence 
(behavioural, psychophysiological or neurophysiological) that the stimulus has in fact 
been processed154.
Other terms, such as ‘subliminal’ or ‘implicit’ perception, have been used to refer  
to similar conditions of non-conscious perception. However, ‘subliminal’ is more 
frequently encountered in studies of healthy individuals and refers to short or weak 
stimulus presentations that do not elicit a conscious perception155, whereas ‘implicit’ 
is a more general term that is sometimes linked with the less restrictive notion of 
task-irrelevant, involuntary or unintentional processing.
The situation is similar for the term ‘automatic’, which normally means independence 
from top-down factors, especially in relation to attention. In the context of attention 
studies, the term ‘pre-attentive’ is frequently preferred to ‘automatic’, as it more clearly 
indicates that processing of the incoming stimulus occurs before, and independently 
of, attentional selection. Nevertheless, evidence that a stimulus is processed 
pre-attentively does not necessarily imply that the observer is unaware of its presence.
The distinction between conscious and non-conscious perception largely depends on 
the methods used to unravel them. Adopting subjective measures, perception is 
considered to be non-conscious when participants “claim not be able to discriminate 
perceptual information at better than chance level”156, irrespective of whether or not 
their performance (in response to the stimulus) is above chance. Because subjective 
measures are liable to individuals’ response bias, more recent studies have introduced 
objective measures — some derived from signal detection theory34,58,60,61 — that define 
perception as non-conscious only when the perceptual discrimination is at chance 
level34,59,60. In the present Review we use the terms ‘non-conscious perception’ or 
‘perception without awareness’ (which we consider to be almost synonymous) to refer 
to studies that proved, using either subjective or objective measures, that participants 
cannot report the presence of an emotional visual signal.
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of emotional stimuli ideally involves a direct comparison 
between perceived and unperceived, identical stimuli. 
Unfortunately, evidence of this type is difficult to gather 
in healthy individuals because the manipulations that 
are used to render a stimulus ‘invisible’ inevitably also 
render the stimulus spatially and temporally different 
from its consciously visible counterpart.
At present, studies of patients with cortical blind-
ness following destruction of the visual cortex provide 
the best opportunity to clarify the neural basis and 
properties of non-conscious perception of emotional 
stimuli. These patients are permanently blind to stimuli 
presented inside the scotoma (the visual field region 
affected by the cortical lesion), including supra threshold 
and long-lasting stimuli62. Therefore, cortical blind-
ness creates a sharp distinction between conscious and 
non-conscious perception due to sensory, as opposed 
to attentional, causes. These patients are able to dis-
criminate emotional stimuli that they report not to have 
seen, for example by ‘guessing’ whether the stimulus 
expresses happiness or fear2 — a phenomenon known 
as affective blindsight63. Their behavioural fluency in 
this task is associated with activity in several subcortical 
structures that were also active in studies in which non-
conscious perception of emotional stimuli resulted from 
experimental manipulation2,64–69.
A caveat is needed in the case of patients because 
post-lesion and experience-dependent plasticity may 
have enhanced the sensitivity of spared subcorti-
cal nuclei to visual and emotion attributes. Applying 
trans cranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) over the 
visual cortex of healthy participants can create ‘virtual’ 
cortical lesions, leading to transient blindness without 
neuronal reorganization70. The only such TMS study 
to date showed that blocking the cortical visual route 
interrupts conscious perception but does not suppress 
non-conscious perception of emotional stimuli71, as 
participants were able to discriminate between sad and 
happy expressions and locate their position in a four-
item array. This suggests that subcortical contributions 
to non-conscious perception of emotional stimuli are 
not dependent on post-lesion plasticity and also occur 
in the intact brain.
Comparing attentional and sensory unawareness. 
Studies on attentional and sensory unawareness in 
healthy observers have provided evidence that conscious 
and non-conscious modes of perceiving emotional 
stimuli coexist. Beyond these observations, patient stud-
ies offer the opportunity to reveal which brain structures 
are necessary for — rather than simply involved in — 
conscious and non-conscious perception of emotional 
stimuli. Combined evidence from brain imaging 
and patient studies indicates that sensory and atten-
tional unawareness are qualitatively different12,14. In 
sensory unawareness the stimulus strength is insufficient 
to evoke cortical activity in visual areas. Nonetheless, the 
same stimuli can trigger activity in subcortical visual 
structures, such as the superior colliculus, that have a 
lower threshold of activation13,72. This is the appropriate 
condition under which to study the structures that com-
pose the core system for the non-conscious perception of 
emotional stimuli because the stimulus has not already 
been processed in the striate cortex (also known as the 
primary visual cortex; V1). In the case of attentional 
 Box 2 | Methods for uncovering non-conscious perception of emotions
Different methods have been used to induce non-conscious perception of emotions in 
neurologically intact individuals. Studies of attentional unawareness often us  a dual- 
task paradigm. Here, the subject’s attention is absorbed by an attention-demanding task 
while a secondary emotional stimulus is presented. The unattended emotional stimulus 
may be presented at the same or at different locations from the primary (and neutral) 
stimuli. In the first case the effect of object-based attention is investigated, whereas in the 
second case spatial attention is studied. The face- or house-matching task (see the figure) 
is a variant of the dual-task paradigm27. Here, participants have to judge whether or not 
the houses are identical while facial expressions appear at irrelevant locations (see the 
figure, part a). Participants cannot tell whether the ignored faces were fearful or neutral, 
male or female, or indicate the identity of the faces — an example of attentional 
unawareness. Another method to induce attentional unawareness is the attentional blink 
paradigm. Here, a continuous and rapid stream of stimuli is presented at the same location 
and the subject is instructed to detect a target in the stream. The detection of a first target 
prevents the detection of a subsequent target for about half a second (the ‘blink’ period). 
Sensory unawareness may result from backward masking (see the figure, part b) or from 
binocular rivalry. In the first case, an initial, emotional target stimulus is briefly presented, 
immediately followed by a neutral ‘masking’ stimulus. If the interval between the onset of 
the target and the masking stimuli is sufficiently brief (typically <30 ms) the subject is 
unaware of the first stimulus and only reports the second (neutral) stimulus3,7. In binocular 
rivalry paradigms different images are presented to the corresponding regions of the two 
eyes. Under these conditions monocular channels in the primary visual cortex (V1) 
alternatively inhibit each other so that one of the two images dominates perception at any 
given moment and is consciously perceived, whereas the other image is suppressed and 
does not reach awareness52. Spontaneous alternations of which stimulus is consciously 
perceived occur, with each dominant percept lasting a few seconds. Part a is modified, 
with permission, from REF. 27 © (2001) Cell Press.
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unawareness, the emotional stimulus has entered the 
cortical visual system, starting with V1, and is poten-
tially accessible to consciousness but does not actually 
gain access to awareness because attention is allocated 
elsewhere, thereby reducing cortical responsivity to the 
unattended stimulus16. This case is the best suited for 
understanding at what stage along the information-
processing stream the emotional content is extracted 
from a stimulus and how structures that are involved in 
non-conscious perception of emotional stimuli modulate 
cortical activity in visual and attentional areas.
A limitation in our present understanding of attent-
ional and sensory unawareness for emotional stimuli 
concerns the prevailing use of stimuli that are related 
to danger (that is, fearful and angry expressions), and it 
is still disputed whether signals conveying other emo-
tions engage similar processes and structures. However, 
recent data indicate partly similar, though weaker, effects 
when non-conscious perception of happiness, sadness or 
disgust is tested38,48,49,64,68.
Functional and structural neuroanatomy
Human adult brain: topological aspects. Different 
subcortical structures are involved in non-conscious 
perception of emotional stimuli (FIG. 1). Several of these 
structures have been investigated extensively and their 
functions are reasonably well understood, whereas the 
involvement of other areas became apparent only recently 
and requires further study. At present, a distinction can 
be made between two subsystems. The first consists of 
structures that are involved in the visual encoding of 
emotional stimuli and that are directly connected to sub-
cortical centres that include visually responsive neurons. 
This system entails a pathway including the superior col-
liculus, the visual pulvinar, the amygdala, the substantia 
innominata and the nucleus accumbens. The second is 
a network that encompasses subcortical areas that are 
recruited for non-visual emotion-related functions, such 
as emotional reactions, memory consolidation, motiva-
tion and disposition tendencies. This second network 
mainly includes the locus coeruleus, the periaqueductal 
grey, the nucleus basalis of Meynert, parts of the basal 
ganglia, the hypothalamus and the hippocampus.
The superior colliculus is a laminar brainstem structure 
that receives direct projections from retinal ganglion cells 
with large receptive fields and with rapidly conducting 
axons that form the magnocellular pathway73. Superior 
colliculus activity is largely unaffected by lesions of 
cortical visual areas74 and responds to non-consciously 
perceived emotional stimuli in normal individuals50,51,53 
Figure 1 |	Cortical	and	subcortical	pathways	for	vision	and	emotion.	a	| The primary visual pathway (shown by thick 
arrows) originates from the retina and projects to the primary visual cortex (V1) in the occipital lobe via an intermediate 
station in the lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN) of the thalamus (Th). From V1, visual information reaches the extrastriat  
cortex along the ventral (occipitotemporal) and the dorsal (occipitoparietal) stream. However, a minority of fibres 
originating from the retina take a secondary route (shown by thin arrows) and reach both the superior colliculus (SC) and 
the pulvinar (Pulv). These two subcortical sites are connected and also send direct projections to the extrastriate visual 
cortex, bypassing V1. Another V1-independent visual pathway consists of the direct projections between the superior 
colliculus and the LGN that, in turn, send efferents to extrastriate cortices in the dorsal stream. b	| The ‘emotion system’ 
includes several cortical and subcortical areas. Among the subcortical structures are the amygdala (AMG) and the 
substantia innominata (SI; shown in green), which are buried deeply in the temporal lobe and in the basal forebrain, 
respectively, the nucleus accumbens (NA) in the basal ganglia (shown in green) and brainstem nuclei (shown in yellow), 
such as the periaqueductal grey (PAG) and the locus coeruleus (LC). Among cortical areas (shown in red) are the 
orbitofrontal (OFC) and the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). The visual and emotional systems are extensively 
interconnected, especially at the subcortical level, where the superior colliculus is connected to the amygdala via  
the pulvinar. Direct connections also exist between subcortical and cortical emotion regions (for example, between the 
amygdala and OFC or ACC), between subcortical structures for emotions and cortical visual areas (for example, between 
the amygdala and temporal cortex) (not shown) and between brainstem nuclei and the cortex via diffuse projections 
(shown only from the LC). Grey arrows indicate connections within the emotion system.
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and in patients with cortical blindness64,66,75. The superior 
colliculus is the earliest post-retinal subcortical structure 
that responds to coarse (that is, low spatial frequency) 
emotional stimuli.
The pulvinar is responsive to salient visual targets 
and is active during non-conscious perception of emo-
tional stimuli64,66,75. It comprises several retinotopically-
organized subnuclei and its lateral and inferior parts 
receive direct projections from the retina and from 
the superior colliculus76. The pulvinar is also involved 
in attentional mechanisms and its lesion abolishes the 
automatic ‘attention-grabbing’ effects of consciously 
perceived emotional stimuli77. It is unclear, however, 
whether this effect of pulvinar damage indicates a direct 
role of the pulvinar in the perception of emotional 
stimuli or an interference with the relay of visual infor-
mation to the amygdala, with which the pulvinar is 
monosynaptically connected78.
The amygdala is perhaps the most extensively stud-
ied subcortical structure that is involved in emotion 
processing, particularly with respect to its role in the 
perception and response to danger79,80. Contrary to 
the traditional view, positively valenced emotional 
stimuli, like happy or surprised expressions, can also 
activate the amygdala49,81,82 but with a qualitatively differ-
ent response profile that entails more activity in ventral 
parts and only at later stimulus presentations compared 
to fearful expressions82. Amygdala activation in response 
to emotional stimuli has been reported under conditions 
of sensory6,7,46,48–56 and attentional unawareness25–28 in 
neurologically intact observers and in brain-damaged 
patients with cortical blindness or hemispatial neglect. 
The amygdala is involved in both conscious and non-
conscious perception of emotional stimuli (unlike the 
superior colliculus and pulvinar)81. This dual role is 
probably related to the fact that the amygdala is a com-
plex system (it includes up to 12 subnuclei) and receives 
visual information from different pathways — one 
originating in the sensory cortex and one originating in 
subcortical areas79. Therefore, a better understanding of 
the amygdala’s functions in non-conscious perception 
of emotional stimuli can be achieved by considering the 
different sensory networks of which the amygdala is part 
and by focusing on its connectivity, as discussed below.
The substantia innominata is a sublenticular portion 
of the basal forebrain and comprises several intermingled 
neuronal groups — such as the sublenticular extended 
amygdala and the bed nucleus of the stria terminalis — 
that represent an extension of the dorsal amygdala83,84. 
Activity in the substantia innominata may be triggered by 
backwardly masked emotional stimuli7, but its response is 
probably secondary to amygdala activity. Moreover, there 
is currently no evidence about the involvement of the 
substantia innominata during non-conscious perception 
of emotional stimuli in patients with cortical blindness or 
about its role in attentional unawareness. Several studies 
have reported activity in the substantia innominata in 
response to consciously perceived emotional stimuli84,85. 
This activity differs from the amygdala, however, in that 
it seems to respond more to the arousal rather than the 
emotional valence of the stimuli85,86.
The nucleus accumbens (or ventral striatum) has 
been implicated in reward processing and it is acti-
vated even by non-consciously perceived omissions of 
expected rewards87. This is consistent with initial find-
ings that suggested a connection from the superi or 
colliculus to the striatum via the pulvinar and with 
the presence of a dopaminergic output pathway to the 
substantia nigra88,89.
The periaqueductal grey and the locus coeruleus are 
implicated in relatively automatic and reflex-like defen-
sive responses90. The periaqueductal grey is located close 
to the superior colliculus, from which it receives visual 
information. The locus coeruleus is a source of noradren-
ergic activation and it modulates cortical activity91 (for 
example, in the anterior cingulate and ventral pre frontal 
regions), as well as activity in subcortical structures, 
such as the amygdala, pulvinar and superior colliculus, 
in response to non-consciously perceived emotions50. 
A similar function has been postulated for other nuclei 
in the substantia innominata, such as the nucleus basalis 
of Meynert, which receives afferents from the amygdala 
and projects to widespread cortical areas under cholin-
ergic modulation92. The basal ganglia are involved in 
automatic motor responses and in conscious emotion 
recognition93,94. One study also reported basal ganglia 
activity for backwardly masked expressions of disgust95. 
The hypothalamus has been implicated in consumptive 
behaviours and in homeostasis96 and is part of an exten-
sive reward network that also includes the amygdala and 
ventral striatum. Finally, the hippocampus is involved 
in the contextual evaluation of emotional stimuli and 
works together with the amygdala in mediating implicit 
learning and memory consolidation for consciously and 
non-consciously perceived emotional stimuli6.
Human adult brain: network aspects. Recent neuro-
imaging data have clarified the functional connectivity 
between several subcortical structures that are involved 
in non-conscious perception of emotional stimuli. The 
superior colliculus, pulvinar and amygdala constitute 
a functional network that shows increased, positive 
covariation of activity in response to non-consciously 
perceived fearful facial expressions50,51,53. By contrast, 
the major cortical pathway relaying visual input to the 
amygdala — starting from the V1 and terminating in 
the inferotemporal cortex that provides the direct 
connection to the amygdala79,80 — does not show sub-
stantial activity and functional connectivity under the 
same conditions but does so during conscious percep-
tion of emotional stimuli53,55. These results suggest that 
a functional subcortical pathway to the amygdala is 
engaged during non-conscious fear perception. Similar 
findings have been reported in patients with cortical 
blindness in response to non-consciously perceived 
facial and bodily expressions of fear and happiness and 
support the notion of a functional segregation between 
subcortical and cortical pathways64,66,75.
Covariations in functional responses do not necess-
arily indicate direct anatomical connectivity among the 
implicated regions. The anatomical connections between 
the structures that form the subcortical system for 
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non-conscious perception of emotional stimuli have been 
studied in primate and non-primate animals (see below), 
but almost nothing is known about these connections 
in the human brain. A recent diffusion tensor imaging 
(DTI) study, involving a patient with cortical blindness 
and five age-matched healthy observers97, showed direct 
connections between the structures of the subcortical 
network (that is, between the superior colliculus and 
amygdala via the pulvinar) in all subjects. Notably, 
however, the number of fibres in the patient with corti-
cal blindness was increased and the shape of the fibre 
bundle was different, forming a loop between the three 
structures that was absent in normal subjects97.
On the basis of studies in animals, two functional 
properties have been proposed and tested for this 
subcortical system: first, it provides a rapid analysis of 
the emotional attributes of the stimuli; and, second, it 
is responsive to the more coarse aspects of the stimu-
lus (for example, its global shape and configuration)5. 
Electroencephalography (EEG) and magnetoencephalo-
graphy (MEG) studies have provided mixed results 
regarding the speed of processing in the subcortical 
system, with some studies showing fast processing of 
emotional stimuli before any fine-grained analysis or 
attentional modulation can occur98,99, and others show-
ing longer latencies100. A recent study that combined 
MEG and MRI methods reported early, event-related 
synchronization in the posterior thalamus (probably in 
the pulvinar), as fast as 10–20 ms after onset of the pres-
entation of fearful facial expressions, followed by event-
related synchronization in the amygdala at 20–30 ms 
after onset101. By comparison, synchronization in the 
striate cortex occurred only 40–50 ms after stimulus 
onset. With respect to the second functional aspect, 
responses in the superior colliculus and pulvinar are 
tuned to coarse information in low spatial frequencies 
because these structures receive visual information from 
the magnocellular pathway73. By contrast, cortical areas 
in the ventral visual stream receive visual information 
predominantly from the parvocellular pathway, which 
provides high spatial frequency signals102. Consistent 
with these neurophysiological findings, the subcortical 
pathway to the amygdala is specifically sensitive to the 
presentation of fearful faces in low spatial frequencies103.
Homologous pathways in animal brains. Studies in rats 
and birds have demonstrated that a subcortical pathway 
for fast processing of coarse emotional stimuli exists in 
the auditory and visual domains (FIG. 2). This pathway 
encompasses the colliculus, pulvinar and amygdala. 
For example, in birds the optic tectum (an analogue to 
the mammalian superior colliculus) and the nucleus 
rotundus (an analogue to the visual pulvinar) are directly 
connected and relay visual information to the amygdala 
(also known as the taenia)104. After lesions to the optic 
tectum chicks cease to show a startled or excited response 
to behaviourally significant visual stimuli, and can delay 
avoidance and attack responses, indicating the functional 
relevance of this pathway for emotion processing105. 
Likewise, in rats there are direct connections from the 
superior colliculus to thalamic neurons that project to 
the lateral nucleus of the amygdala, forming a subcorti-
cal pathway for the transfer of visual information to the 
amygdala106. Lesions to the rat superior colliculus slow 
down behavioural reactions to threatening stimuli, 
suggesting that the cortical pathway to the amygdala 
can carry out functions that are normally performed 
by the direct subcortical route, but at the expense of 
reaction speed107.
In non-human primates, the role of the amygdala 
in emotion perception (and other social processes) 
has been repeatedly documented since Weiskrantz 
first showed that bilateral lesions to the amygdala were 
sufficient to induce a loss of reactivity to emotional 
visual stimuli108. However, it is disputed whether there 
are direct connections between the areas that form the 
subcortical pathway for processing emotional stimuli in 
the monkey brain (see REF. 29 for a review). Although the 
superior colliculus projects to the inferior parts of 
the pulvinar76, and the amygdala receives projections 
from the medial pulvinar109, direct connections between 
the inferior and medial nuclei of the pulvinar remain 
to be described. Moreover, the superior colliculus also 
projects directly to the intercalated layers of the lateral 
geniculate nucleus110, and it was shown recently that 
Figure 2 |	Subcortical	pathway	for	processing	
emotional	signals	in	the	anim l	brain.	a	| Lateral view 
of the avian brain showing direct connections between the 
retina and the optic tectum (OT) (an analogue of the 
mammalian superior colliculus (SC)), the optic tectum and 
the nucleus rotundus (Rt; an analogue of the visual pulvinar 
(Pulv)) in the thalamus (Th), and the amygdala (AMG). The 
visual Wulst area (Vis; the analogue to the mammalian 
primary visual cortex) is also displayed. b	| Sagittal view of 
the rat brain showing the equivalent pathway from the 
retina to the superior colliculus and from there to the 
pulvinar and the amygdala. Other subcortical and cortical 
structures that are involved in emotion processing are also 
displayed. These include the cingulate cortex (CING) and 
the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), the nucleus accumbens 
(NA), and, in the brainstem, the periaqueductal grey (PAG) 
and the locus coeruleus (LC). V1, primary visual cortex.
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inactivation of the lateral geniculate nucleus abolishes 
residual visual abilities in monkeys with V1 lesions111. 
This raises the possibility, which has not been explored 
directly thus far, that visual information might also reach 
the amygdala through the lateral geniculate nucleus — 
analogous to the direct connections between the medial 
geniculate nucleus and the lateral amygdala that have 
been reported in the auditory domain5,79.
Data from studies in humans and animals are begin-
ning to reveal the continuity of subcortical emotion 
processing across species and its evolutionary role in 
shaping adaptive behaviour. A recent proposal sug-
gests that fear detection has played a major part in 
shaping the visual system of primates and in its integration 
with an emotion circuit that is centred on the amygdala. 
According to this proposal112, snakes presumably repre-
sented a major threat for our ancestors and the need to 
detect them on the ground accelerated the development 
of greater orbital convergence, allowing better short-
range stereopsis, particularly in the lower visual field. 
The koniocellular and magnocellular pathways from the 
retina further developed to connect the superior colliculus 
with the pulvinar, thereby promoting fast and automatic 
detection of snakes. This mechanism presumably became 
generalized for detection of other fear-relevant stimuli. 
The same proposal suggests that the fast reactivity of this 
subcortical pathway to visual stimuli with low resolution 
has also promoted the parallel development of a cortical 
visual pathway to the amygdala with complementary fea-
tures to those of the subcortical pathway112. The cortical 
pathway seems to have drawn on parvocellular input that 
enabled trichromacy and fine-grained foveal vision, which 
may have served to facilitate detailed, slow and conscious 
analysis of visual stimuli to aid deliberate actions.
Consistent with evidence that the subcortical path-
way for processing emotional stimuli emerged early in 
phylogenesis, recent evidence in human and non-human 
primates also indicates that the formation of these same 
structures is more developed at birth compared to the 
relatively immature development of the cortical areas 
involved in visual and emotional processing113 (BOX 3).
The role of non-conscious perception
Non-conscious perception of emotional stimuli has 
behavioural consequences and is accompanied by 
characteristic neurophysiological correlates of changes 
in the emotional state of the (unaware) observer. These 
behavioural and neurophysiological outcomes are often 
qualitatively and quantitatively different from those 
associated with conscious perception, suggesting that 
non-conscious perception of emotional stimuli is not 
simply a degraded counterpart of conscious perception 
but a different mode of processing visual signals.
A system specialized for emotional signals, not only for 
faces. Which stimulus properties trigger non-conscious 
perception of emotional stimuli? Research on emotion per-
ception with and without awareness has concentrated on 
facial expressions114. This has contributed to the prevailing 
assumption that the subcortical pathway is specialized for 
detecting emotional expressions on faces rather than 
for detecting emotional stimuli per se115. However, the ina-
bility of patients with cortical blindness to correctly guess 
non-emotional facial attributes, such as personal identity, 
speaks against this assumption116. Likewise, facial expres-
sions of complex social emotions, like arrogance or guilt, 
seem to require processing in higher visual areas that are 
associated with visual awareness117.
 Box 3 | Ontogenetic development of the subcortical pathway for the perception of emotional signals
The visual system in newborns seems to be more sensitive to low spatial frequency stimuli than in adults. This is reflected 
in the well-documented preference for face detection in newborn babies, as face configurations are easily recognizable in 
the low-frequency range157. At around the age of 5–7 months, infants start to exhibit stable visual discrimination of 
different facial expressions158 and to show the typical effects that emotional stimuli exert on visual and attentional 
mechanisms in adults. These effects encompass the preference to look at fearful over neutral or happy faces, enhanced 
visual and attention-related ERP components99, and difficulties in disengaging attention from faces showing fearful 
expressions159. Facial expression preferences seem to be mediated by the subcortical pathway, which includes the 
superior colliculus, pulvinar and amygdala115. This is consistent with findings from monkeys showing that the formation 
of these structures and their connections with the cortex are more complete at birth compared with the relatively 
immature development of the cortical visual system160, which also shows higher levels of plasticity and neural 
reorganization during development161.
Subcortical orientation to, and processing of, stimuli such as faces in the early stages of development may represent 
the starting point for the later specialization of portions of the visual cortex to specific categories of emotionally relevant 
stimuli such as faces (in the fusiform face area)147 or bodies (in the extrastriate body area)148. From this perspective115, the 
early functioning of the subcortical system would ensure that infants preferentially orient to categories of visual stimuli 
that potentially convey emotion information. This induces foveation to such stimuli more often than to others, thereby 
providing a more frequent input to the visual cortex. In addition, the modulatory influence of subcortical structures over 
the visual cortex can result in enhanced	cortical activity in response to faces or bodies and this further accelerates 
cortical specialization. Consistent with the proposed role of the subcortical system during development, atypically 
developing children with autism, who have amygdala dysfunctions162, seem to depend more on high spatial frequency 
aspects for processing faces than typical individuals163. As is the case with other development mechanisms in the brain, it 
is likely that newborns’ sensitivity to emotional expressions results from the combination of an experience-independent 
system — located in subcortical structures — that is biased to process coarse emotional stimuli and experience- 
dependent factors that promote functional coupling of these structures with visual and attentional areas in the cortex, 
by refining and stabilizing initially existing cortico–subcortical synaptic connections113.
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Recent findings suggest that not just a person’s face 
but their whole body posture can trigger non-conscious 
perception of the person’s emotions in an observer118,119. 
It therefore makes sense to assume that, like facial 
expressions, body postures belong to a category of bio-
logical stimuli to which we are evolutionarily prepared to 
respond. Non-conscious perception of body expressions 
indicating fear or joy activates the pulvinar and can induce 
arousal or mimicry responses in healthy individuals 
and in patients with cortical blindness45,64,68, whereas 
unattended angry or fearful bodily expressions can acti-
vate the amygdala and summon attention in healthy 
individuals119 and patients with hemispatial neglect34.
Stimuli that represent evolution-determined threats, 
such as spiders and snakes, have also been tested 
under conditions of visual unawareness. These stimuli 
induced enhanced physiological arousal and amygdala 
activity120–122, particularly in individuals who were 
phobic to these types of stimuli, and summoned atten-
tion in patients with hemispatial neglect37. By contrast, 
showing complex affective scenes123 (for example, 
cockroaches or houses on fire) to cortically blind patients 
did not have such effects; the patients were unable to 
guess the emotional content of these scenes. This sug-
gests that the analysis of the emotional content of com-
plex scenes may depend on conscious visual perception 
and cortical processing, although further research is 
needed to confirm this.
Autonomic and expressive changes. Non-conscious 
perception of emotional stimuli is generally associ-
ated with more rapid and intense responses in terms 
of physiological changes and facial expressions (in 
the observer) than conscious perception of emotional 
stimuli. This suggests an inverse relationship between 
stimulus awareness and its impact on behavioural and 
neurophysiological reactions.
Physiological changes that are associated with non-
conscious perception of emotional stimuli include 
enhanced skin conductance3,41, increased frequency of 
eye blink (indicating startle reactions or avoidance)65, 
changes in stress hormone levels124, increased pupil 
dilation68 and heart rate changes125. These changes index 
arousal and their function is to prepare the organism 
for reacting to impeding and salient events.
In the unaware observer, undetected emotional stimuli 
can also induce spontaneous facial reactions that reflect 
the affective valence of the stimuli, as recorded using 
electromyography (EMG)45,68. This spontaneous tendency 
to synchronize our facial expressions with the emotional 
meaning of other individuals’ expressions is likely to play 
a part in social interactions126. Spontaneous facial expres-
sions are served by the extrapyramidal motor system in 
which the basal ganglia have a major role, whereas inten-
tional expressions are mediated by the pyramidal system, 
which is under cortical control127. A recent study has 
measured psychophysiological and expressive changes 
associated with conscious and non-conscious percep-
tion of facial and bodily expressions of fear and happiness 
in patients with cortical blindness68. Results showed 
that facial reactions were faster and autonomic arousal 
was higher for non-consciously than for consciously 
perceived stimuli (FIG. 3). This is in line with data show-
ing that physiological and expressive responses can be 
stronger128 and faster42 when triggered by emotional 
signals that remain inaccessible to awareness.
Neural integration and awareness
The findings described above indicate that non- 
conscious perception of emotional stimuli is associ-
ated with the functional integrity and activity of several 
subcortical structures, which seem to function inde-
pendently of cortical areas. This raises the question of 
whether the distinction between subcortical and cortical 
processes simply overlaps with the distinction between 
non-conscious and conscious perception. Two alterna-
tive proposals have been put forth129. The first proposal 
is that conscious and non-conscious perception have 
the same neural correlates but that in the case of vision 
without awareness the evoked brain activity is simply 
less than for consciously perceived stimuli. The differ-
ence is thus a matter of quantity of neural activity. This 
view is supported by evidence that higher-order visual 
areas, such as the parahippocampal gyrus, the fusiform 
gyrus or the middle temporal area (MT; also known as 
visual area V5), are activated by category-specific stimu-
lus properties (for example, the presence of a house, a 
face or a moving stimulus, respectively) regardless of 
whether or not the stimuli are consciously perceived, 
but with higher levels of cortical activation in the case 
of conscious perception130–132. A second proposal is that 
there are separate pathways for conscious and non- 
conscious vision that already diverge from relatively early 
processing stages. Here, the difference between neural 
systems sustaining vision with and without awareness is 
qualitative. This second proposal is indirectly supported 
by psychophysical evidence showing that conscious 
and non-conscious perception have different sensory 
thresholds13,133,134 and, more directly, by neuroimaging 
evidence that visual awareness is associated with activ-
ity in temporal or prefrontal cortices135,136, whereas non-
conscious perception induces activity in subcortical 
or early sensory areas137–139. Notably, however, the two 
theories overlap in assuming that visual consciousness 
is linked to enhanced or exclusive activity (according to 
the former and latter hypotheses, respectively) in sev-
eral crucial cortical areas; either in the occipitotemporal 
visual cortex alone or in association with frontoparietal 
networks that exert top-down amplification over 
sensory areas12.
It is worth considering a third alternative that, 
although primarily derived from emotion studies, seems 
to fit better with the data concerning visual awareness of 
neutral stimuli. We propose that the neural pathways for 
conscious and non-conscious perception of emotions are 
not entirely different and are not completely segregated. 
A major difference between the two types of percep-
tion may be the combined involvement of cortical areas 
and of cortico–subcortical interactions when stimuli 
are consciously perceived. The dichotomy of conscious 
and non-conscious perception of emotional signals can 
thus be reformulated in neural terms as the integration 
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of activity in subcortical and cortical structures. Fast-
latency responses supported by excitatory feedforward 
connections along the colliculus–pulvinar–amygdala 
pathway may be too rapid and/or too weak to engage the 
cortex and to generate the re-entrant cortico–subcortical 
feedback that is associated with visual awareness53. 
Indeed, these back-projecting neurons from cortical to 
subcortical areas probably have higher activation thresh-
olds than the forward-projecting neurons in subcorti-
cal sites and therefore may not be activated by the weak 
neural response evoked by non-consciously perceived 
stimuli13,133,134. As this cortical feedback might reflect 
inhibitory modulation over subcortical areas140, its 
absence during non-conscious perception of emotional 
stimuli could also explain the apparently paradoxi-
cal finding that subcortical activity can be enhanced, 
rather than being unchanged or reduced, during non-
conscious compared to conscious perception of emo-
tional stimuli25,56. Therefore, our hypothesis is also 
consistent with dynamic models that consider re-entrant 
cortical feedback — at slow timescales and synchronized 
in the gamma-band frequency — to be critical to the 
emergence of visual awareness141. This dynamic integra-
tion may result from the excitatory action of subcortical 
over cortical areas and the inhibitory activity cortical over 
subcortical structures.
This third alternative seems to be supported by 
several behavioural and neurophysiological findings 
reported here. At the behavioural level, unattended 
or non-consciously perceived emotional stimuli can 
interfere with an explicit ongoing task — for example, 
by disrupting performance18,19, by delaying or speed-
ing up responses to a simultaneously present and con-
sciously perceived emotional signal (depending on the 
emotional congruence between the two stimuli60,69), by 
affecting the disengagement of attention20 or by altering 
perceptual sensitivity34. Likewise, attitudes and prefer-
ences towards neutral stimuli may be shifted towards 
Figure 3 |	Expressive	and	autonomic	changes	induced	by	non-conscious	perception	of	emotional	stimuli.	
Spontaneous facial and pupillary reactions can be triggered by passive exposure to consciously and non-consciously 
perceived expressions of fear and happiness in patients with cortical blindness and ‘affective blindsight’. The 
zygomaticus major muscle (which is involved in smiling) is activated to a greater extent by conscious and non-conscious 
perception of happy expressions than by conscious and non-conscious perception of fearful expressions, whereas the 
corrugator supercilii (which is involved in frowning) is activated by conscious and non-conscious perception of fearful 
expressions more strongly than by perception of happy expressions. Notably, facial reactions are faster and pupil dilation 
(indicative of autonomic arousal) is higher for non-consciously than for consciously perceived facial and bodily 
expressions. Data from REF. 68. Image reproduced, with permission, from REF. 63 © (2010) Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 
All rights reserved. EMG, electromyography.
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more positive or more negative evaluations depending 
on whether the neutral stimuli are preceded by, or paired 
with, un perceived emotional stimuli142,143. Notably, 
however, when subjects are aware of the presence and 
nature of the emotional stimuli these effects sometimes 
disappear143,144.
At the neural level the subcortical system that is 
involved in non-conscious perception of emotional stim-
uli can interact with cortical areas that are associated with 
visual awareness and conscious perception of emotional 
signals. This can occur in several direct or indirect ways, 
which may partly explain findings that report cortical 
activity for non-consciously perceived emotional stimuli 
(FIG. 4). In the first case, given the direct connections of 
subcortical sites to different visual areas in the dorsal or 
ventral stream, subcortical structures can modulate activ-
ity in the visual cortex and so enhance responses to emo-
tional stimuli. For example, the amygdala back-projects 
to all cortical stages along the ventral visual stream in a 
topographically organized manner up to the V1 (REF. 145). 
The superior colliculus is also connected to extrastriate 
areas through the pulvinar76 and the lateral geniculate 
nucleus110, and activity in these cortical areas can 
persist after destruction of V1 but not after subsequent 
destruction of the superior colliculus146. Therefore, 
these direct mechanisms also affect cortical visual pro-
cesses when the emotional stimulus is perceived non- 
consciously, modulating extrastriate functions in a precise, 
category-specific, fashion147,148. In line with this, enhanced 
processing of emotional stimuli in the extrastriate cortex 
is abolished by lesions to the amygdala that leave the visual 
cortex intact149. Moreover, the amygdala has direct con-
nections to cortical areas related to conscious perception 
of emotional stimuli, such as the orbitofrontal and cingu-
late cortices80, thereby providing a likely site of conver-
gence between conscious and non-conscious perception. 
Finally, subcortical structures can also modulate cortical 
activity and influence conscious perception indirectly 
through downstream connections to different sites in the 
basal forebrain and brainstem that project to widespread 
cortical regions, including visual areas and frontoparietal 
regions that are involved in attentional control. These indi-
rect routes encompass the dopaminergic pathway from 
the substantia nigra, the noradrenergic pathway involving the 
locus coeruleus and the cholinergic system, to which 
the nucleus basalis of Meynert belongs.
Outstanding questions
Not surprisingly, the major outstanding questions that 
are raised by non-conscious perception represent chal-
lenges to current cortical theories of consciousness, of 
emotion and subjective experience.
Do observers who show non-conscious perception 
of emotional signals actually experience their own emo-
tional changes consciously? Studies into neurophysi-
ological and bodily changes associated with emotions 
are classical sources of evidence for understanding the 
relationship between an emotional state (that is, 
the objective functional state of the person) and the con-
scious experience of being in such a state (that is, the 
feeling associated with the emotional state)150. In other 
words, is it possible that, although the eliciting emotional 
stimuli remain non-conscious, the (unaware) observer 
consciously feels the psychophysiological responses 
induced by these stimuli? There is initial evidence that 
this might be the case in patients with cortical blind-
ness151. These patients, despite being unaware of the 
eliciting stimulus, reported negative feelings that were 
associated with activity in the somatosensory cortex.
Another aspect concerns the relationship between 
non-conscious perception of emotions and decision-
making. Is it possible that when subjects perceive emo-
tional stimuli non-consciously they unwittingly ‘sense’ 
the somatic changes elicited by the stimuli and use them 
as a guide to orient their decisions and preferences? This 
notion is reminiscent of the facial feedback hypothesis152 
or of more elaborate theories about the relationship 
between bodily changes and decision-making, such as 
the somatic-marker hypothesis153. These issues are clearly 
crucial to fully exploring the potential influence of non-
conscious perception of emotional stimuli in daily life, 
and attention needs to be paid in the future to the affective 
resonance and influence exerted by ‘unseen’ emotional 
signals over our conscious experience and our intentional 
behaviour towards the consciously perceived world.
Figure 4 |	Circuits	for	subcortical	modulation	of	cortical	activity.	Subcortical 
structures that are involved in non-conscious perception of emotions can modulate 
cortical activity either directly or indirectly. The amygdala has direct connections  
to cortical visual areas in the ventral stream, to the orbitofrontal and anterior  
cingulate cortices, which are involved in conscious perception of emotions, and to  
the frontoparietal network, which is involved in attention. The pulvinar has direct 
connections to the visual cortex in the dorsal stream, to the frontoparietal network and 
to the amygdala. Subcortical structures can also modulate cortical activity indirectly 
through downstream connections to other sites in the basal forebrain and in the 
brainstem that project to widespread cortical regions. To simplify the diagram only the 
most relevant connections discussed in the text are shown. Emotion-related subcortical 
areas are shown in green; areas involved in visual processing are shown in blue; 
emotion-related cortical areas are shown in red; brainstem areas are shown in yellow.  
NB of Meynert, nucleus basalis of Meynert. 
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